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ANIMACY’S EFFECT ON ATTENTION AND MEMORY IN HUMANS AND MACAQUES 
(MACACA MULATTA) 
by 
JENNIFER M. JOHNSON 
Under the Direction of David A. Washburn PhD 
 
ABSTRACT 
Understanding what stimuli are naturally salient is important not only for future research 
designs, but also for understanding underlying cognitive mechanisms that influence memory and 
attention across species. Previous research has shown that humans show preferential processing 
of animate over inanimate stimuli. Specifically, humans remember animate stimuli better than 
inanimate stimuli, and animate stimuli capture attention more quickly than inanimate stimuli 
(Nairne, Thompson, & Paneirada, 2007; New, Cosmides, & Tooby, 2007). One hypothesis is that 
this occurs due to evolutionary adapted mechanisms: our ancestors needed to monitor living 
things more closely because those things are most important to survival. However, few 
researchers have looked into the animacy effect using picture stimuli, and there has been no 
research on the animacy effect with nonhuman animals. The current study examined whether this 
adaptation theory holds true for humans and macaques using novel picture-based tasks. Neither 
antisaccade or symbolic match-to-sample tasks showed a significant difference in attention to or 
memory for animate versus inanimate stimuli with human participants, suggesting that the 
animacy effect does not hold true for picture stimuli. Additionally, macaques only exhibited a 
significant difference between stimulus types in the memory task, casting doubt on the theory 
that attention to animacy may be an evolutionary adapted mechanism, at least for static stimuli.  
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1 INTRODUCTION  
The goal for the evolutionary psychologist is to reconstruct adaptive problems faced by 
our ancestors and to uncover the psychological mechanisms that evolved to solve these problems 
(Cosmides & Tooby, 1992; Laland & Brown, 2011). Evolutionary psychologists argue that our 
behaviors, biases, and thoughts can provide insight in to our ancestral past (Cosmides & Tooby, 
1992; Klein, Cosmides, Tooby, & Chance 2002). They reason that cognitive processes, such as 
attention and memory, were shaped by natural selection in the same way biological processes 
were (Klein et al., 2002). Whereas most memory research, for example, looks at what memory 
mechanisms can and cannot do and under what conditions those systems are engaged, adaptive 
cognition research has taken a step back to the functionalist approach of the early 1900s to 
examine how and what evolutionary value is provided by different aspects of cognition. 
Scientists within this tradition, including evolutionary psychologists and many cognitive 
neuroscientists, ask what kind of problems various cognitive processes were designed or 
developed to solve.  
Tooby and Cosmides (1989) outlined several steps that evolutionary psychologists 
needed to take to develop informed theories. The first four steps involve developing models of 
adaptive problems that our ancestors had to solve and then hypothesizing how these problems 
could have molded the human mind, all before collecting data. Unfortunately, even Tooby and 
Cosmides (2005) acknowledged that many evolutionary researchers skip these steps and instead 
fit a hypothesis to existing data. Specifically, these ‘Just so’ stories arise when researchers form 
post hoc narratives about observed cognitive and behavioral phenomena. Teleological 
hypotheses plague evolutionary psychology due to their lack of testability and sensational quality 
(Laland & Brown, 2011). These retrospective hypotheses are not falsifiable because it is 
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impossible to observe the direct evolutionary path of memory (Laland & Brown, 2011; Nairne, 
Pandeirada, & Thompson, 2008).  
Many evolutionary psychologists attempt to trace our cognitive evolution to our Stone 
Age ancestors from the Pleistocene era on the African plains, referred to as the environment of 
evolutionary adaptedness (EEA; Tooby & Cosmides, 1989), but little is actually known about the 
problems faced by our ancestors at this time. Additionally, it has been argued that environments 
varied widely across populations during the Pleistocene era making it incorrect to claim that all 
‘hunter-gatherers’ faced similar problems (e.g., Laland & Brown, 2011). Whereas this view of 
the EEA is not agreed upon by all evolutionary psychologists, and some researchers have 
adapted their view to include the variability of the era (Tooby & Cosmides, 1990), the 
stereotypical idea of our ancestors as generic hunter-gatherers on the African plains continues to 
be used as a foundation for hypotheses and undisciplined conjectures (Laland & Brown, 2011). 
Nairne, Thompson, and Paneirada (2007) developed a testable, evolutionarily-driven 
hypothesis without relying on post hoc speculations. They noted that many strategies that 
enhance retention have been identified and thoroughly studied, such as the method of loci or 
elaboration, but few had looked at the functional value of these strategies (e.g. Blunt, 2015; 
Willoughby et al., 1997). Nairne and colleagues hypothesized that humans should be sensitive to 
the fitness-relevance of the to-be-remembered information and consequently should remember 
information better when processed in relation to survival relevance. From this a priori 
hypothesis, Nairne and collaborators used an incidental learning task where participants rated 
words for their usefulness to survival if they were stranded in a foreign grassland, usefulness to 
moving to a foreign land, or overall pleasantness. The results supported the hypothesis by 
showing that participants’ retention was better for those who processed the words based on 
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survival in both free recall and recognition tasks. Nairne et al. (2008) replicated the findings of 
Nairne et al. (2007), and included other processing conditions: Imagery, self-reference, 
generation, and intentional learning. Participants in the survival processing condition 
remembered significantly more words than participants in all other conditions. Subsequent 
research supported the hypothesis for the survival processing effect across various contexts and 
methodologies (e.g., Aslan & Bauml, 2008; Nairne & Pandeirada, 2010, 2011; Nairne et al., 
2008; Nouchi, 2012).  
However, many researchers have found various proximate mechanisms that mediate the 
survival processing effect (e.g., Howe and Derbish, 2010; Kroneisen & Erdfelder, 2011; Nouchi, 
2013; Savine, Scullin, & Roediger, 2011; Tse & Altarriba, 2010). Although these proximate 
mechanisms do not falsify the survival processing hypothesis, evolutionary psychologists seem 
to be going back to ‘Just so’ stories to explain away the differences in results.  For example, 
Howe and Derbish (2010) argued that the survival processing effect is not due to some specific 
adaptive mechanism that enhances memory in survival-related scenarios, but instead, that 
domain-general processes, such as elaboration strategies, lead to enhanced retention of novel and 
unique situations like those used in the typical survival-effect task. Across multiple experiments, 
Howe and Derbish demonstrated that elaboration strategies accounted for the differences in 
memory of survival-related scenarios versus other neutral scenarios.  Using a memory load 
paradigm, Nouchi (2013) also showed that the survival processing effect can be accounted for by 
elaboration processes. However, Nairne and Pandeirada (2016) argued that the fact that domain-
general processes like elaboration or richness-of-encoding are involved in enhancing survival-
processing is irrelevant to whether the survival processing advantage is an adapted process, 
because processing based on survival relevance must have been so important that it needed to co-
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opt these basic but general processes. Similarly, they argued that any evidence of boundary 
conditions for the survival-processing effect do not weaken their argument. These arguments 
result in roundabout discussions about which came first: domain general processes that can result 
in enhanced survival processing, or enhanced survival processing that draws from domain 
general processes.  
Despite the survival-processing effect starting out as a testable, a priori hypothesis that 
avoided ‘Just so’ criticisms, attempts to downplay all domain-general processes that have been 
demonstrated to underlie the effect and several boundary conditions have resulted in a general 
loss of interest. Additionally, Nairne (2014) suggested that “survival” may be too general of a 
concept to have steered selection, and instead hypothesized that we evolved unique mechanisms 
to deal with specific adaptive problems. Because of this, Nairne and other researchers developed 
more specified hypotheses that focused on distinct adaptive dimensions (Nairne, 2014; Nairne et 
al., 2013; New, Cosmides, & Tooby, 2007; VanArsdall, Nairne, Pandeirada, & Blunt, 2013). 
1.1 Animacy Effect 
The importance of the animate-inanimate distinction has been widely studied across 
disciplines. Animate entities (hereafter animates), as defined by Gelman and Spelke (1981), 
include biological structures that can initiate action, grow and reproduce, know, learn and think, 
and are biological structures. Although Gelman and Spelke (1981) state that animates are 
primarily people, in general, animate versus inanimate is the difference between living and 
nonliving things, or even more simply, the distinction between animals and nonanimals. In 
developmental research, the distinction between living and nonliving has been shown to arise 
early in infancy (Gelman & Spelke, 1981; Opfer & Gelman, 2010). Research has shown that 
animacy is an important factor in learning early in life (see summary in Opfer & Gelman, 2011). 
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Specifically, attention to animacy enhances children’s abilities to learn new nouns, and children 
have early developing expectations about animates’ role in agency in various events, affecting 
their sentence comprehension and understanding of syntax (Branigan, Pickering, & Tanaka, 
2008; Childers & Echols, 2004). Additionally, the neuroscience literature shows that different 
brain regions are associated with processing animate entities compared to inanimate entities 
(e.g., Caramazza & Shelton, 1998; Grossman et al., 2002; Morito, Tanabe, Kochiyama, & 
Sadato, 2009; Wiggett, Pritchard, & Downing, 2009). For example, Wiggett et al. (2009) found 
ventrolateral visual brain regions were activated when processing a variety of different animate 
stimuli whereas ventromedial visual brain regions were activated when processing a variety of 
inanimate stimuli across various kinds of tasks.  
New et al. (2007) hypothesized that animate entities would have been more important 
than inanimate entities to detect and monitor because they could be predators, prey, or mates, or 
could provide social information. Specifically, New et al. predicted that changes would be 
detected faster and with greater accuracy in a change-detection task to animates than inanimates 
because of the ancestral need for the former to be actively monitored. In a series of studies using 
a change-detection paradigm, New et al. reported that animates were detected more quickly and 
more accurately, and they reported that this was not due to differences in low-level features of 
those stimuli. Further, animate stimuli were found not to be judged as more interesting than 
inanimate stimuli, ruling this out as a factor in allocated attention. It is interesting that the 
research also indicated that the animacy advantage does not stem from experience with motion, 
by using static pictures of vehicles as a control category, due to the significance of vehicles in the 
modern world.. Changes to vehicles were detected faster than changes to naturally static 
inanimate stimuli, but changes to animates were detected significantly faster than both. New et 
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al. concluded that human attention was adapted to prioritize animates because they were an 
ancestrally important category. This bias has been labelled the “animate-monitoring hypothesis” 
(New et al., 2007). 
After New et al.’s (2007) seminal findings on the effect of animacy on change detection, 
several studies have supported the hypothesis that animate stimuli are given priority in visual 
attention tasks. Altman et al. (2016) replicated the findings of New et al. (2007), but also found 
that unchanging animate stimuli distract from detecting inanimate changes to the scene. Altman 
and colleagues hypothesized that participants prioritized attention to animate items in the scene, 
even when the animate stimulus was not the target, interfering with detection of changing 
inanimate targets. Additionally, change detection response time to inanimate changes was 
positively correlated with the distance between the inanimate target and the unchanged animate, 
further supporting the idea that attention is allocated to animates and thus they serve as a 
distractor when they are not the target.  Jackson and Calvillo (2013) found that animate stimuli 
were processed more efficiently than inanimate stimuli, and animacy status of stimuli reduced 
the detrimental effects of high perceptual load in a visual search task. Additionally, the animate 
monitoring hypothesis has been supported in attentional blink tasks (Guerrero & Calvillo, 2016), 
and inattentional blindness tasks (Calvillo and Hawkins, 2016; Calvillo & Jackson, 2014). 
Importantly, the studies that include threat as a variable found the effect regardless of the threat-
level of the stimuli (Guerrero & Calvillo, 2016; New et al., 2007). Threat-levels are known to 
have an important attention advantage over non-threatening objects (Fox, Griggs, & 
Mouchlianitis, 2007), so it is important that attention biases for animate entities have been 
differentiated from advantages associated with threatening objects (Guerrero & Calvillo, 2016; 
New et al., 2007). 
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VanArsdall et al. (2013) drew from the animate-monitoring hypothesis to create a series 
of predictions about how animacy would affect memory. They hypothesized that animate entities 
would be better remembered than inanimates. VanArsdall et al. designed a paired-association 
task that paired pronounceable non-words (e.g., “FRAV”) with animate or inanimate properties 
(e.g., “made of wood”) to avoid item selection flaws typically associated with word choice. This 
allowed participants to process and to remember the same stimuli, but with the stimuli processed 
as animates by one group of participants and as inanimates by the other group. VanArsdall et al. 
employed a recognition task (Experiment 1) and a recall task (Experiment 2) and found that 
animates were remembered better than inanimates on both tasks. However, the animate 
characteristics in these experiments only corresponded with uniquely human qualities (e.g., 
“believes in God”). Therefore, the animate non-word pairs consisted of a more cohesive group of 
attributes than did the inanimate pairs.  
Given the nature of their stimuli, VanArsdall et al. (2013) could not conclude whether it 
was animacy versus ‘human-characteristic’ that resulted in improved memory. Aslan and John 
(2016) tested this question by replicating the study of VanArsdall et al. with children ranging in 
ages 4 to 11 years. Unlike VanArsdall et al., Aslan and John included stimulus characteristics 
that were uniquely human, as well as some that represented animals. The size of the animacy 
effect was equivalent across the three age groups and there was no difference between the 
advantage of human versus animal attributes in any group. Aslan and John posited that animacy 
is salient early in life and that experience does not determine the animacy effect, because if it 
did, human attributes would show an advantage over animal attributes. 
Nairne, VanArsdall, Pandeirada, Cogdill, and LeBreton (2013) further explored the 
mnemonic value of animacy by reanalyzing Rubin and Friendly’s (1986) predictor variables of 
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cued recall adding animacy to the list of potential predictor variables. They found that overall 
animacy was one of the highest predictors of cued recall, matching the predictor strength of 
imagery, which was the highest rated variable from the Rubin and Friendly study. Additionally, 
Nairne et al. directly tested animacy as a predictor variable by comparing participants’ recall of 
animate versus inanimate words in an intentional encoding task. Words were matched in age of 
acquisition, category size, category typicality, concreteness, familiarity, imagery, Kucera-Francis 
written frequency, meaning, number of letters, and relatedness. Again, they found that 
participants were significantly more likely to recall animate over inanimate words.  
Bonin, Gelin, and Bugaiska (2014) replicated Nairne et al.’s (2013) experiment using an 
incidental instead of intentional encoding task. Participants were asked to categorize the words as 
either animate or inanimate and were then given a surprise recall task. Not only were animates 
better recalled than inanimates, but animates were also categorized more quickly than inanimates 
during the incidental learning phase, suggesting that processing time did not play a role in the 
animacy advantage. Additionally, Bonin et al. found the same effect using pictures with the word 
label written underneath. In their third experiment, Bonin et al. looked at the animacy effect 
using a word-recognition task. Within this experiment, participants could rate words as either 
remember (consciously remember seeing this item) or know (when they recognize an item based 
on familiarity but cannot consciously remember seeing it). Again, the results showed that 
animate words were categorized faster, more animate words were recognized, and animacy did 
not have a significant effect on false alarms. Additionally, more remember responses (versus 
know) were given to animate words, indicating that participants had an enhanced quality of 
memory for the animate items. Finally, Bonin et al. tested whether richness, as determined by a 
sensory experience rating (SER), drove the animacy advantage, and observed no difference in 
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SER ratings for animate vs. inanimate words. The authors concluded that the animacy effect 
cannot be ascribed to differences in richness of the sensory or perceptual features of animate 
versus inanimate entities. 
VanArsdall et al. (2015) explored the animacy effect in paired-association learning, in a 
context of foreign-language learning, by testing whether it is easier to learn animate foreign-
language vocabulary than inanimate. In Experiment 1, participants learned 24 Swahili-English 
word pairs (taken from Nairne et al., 2013), then were tested (after a distractor task) using the 
Swahili word as the cue. They repeated this procedure 3 times. The results showed a significant 
main effect of word type and the animacy advantage remained constant across trials. To rule out 
the interpretation that animate concepts were more accessible overall, Experiment 2 assessed 
whether using equally constrained categories for animate and inanimate kinds would affect the 
results: four-footed animals versus household furniture. Experiment 2 replicated the procedure of 
Experiment 1 and confirmed a significant advantage of animate word-pairs, even with this 
category control. Additionally, more inanimate responses were incorrect.  
Memory for spatial and temporal context is also aided by the animacy effect. Gelin, 
Bonin, Méot, and Bugaiska (2017) investigated whether participants would remember the spatial 
location or temporal location of a previously presented word better if the word had been animate. 
In Study 1, participants were presented with words in one of four locations on a screen and told 
to categorize the word as animate or inanimate. In a surprise recognition test, participants 
decided whether they had seen a word before and if they had, they selected where the word had 
appeared on the screen during the categorization task. Study 2 used the same methods, but 
instead of manipulating spatial location, each word in the categorization phase appeared with text 
indicating whether it was presented early, middle, or late in the series of words. During the 
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surprise recognition test, participants needed to remember the temporal context of recognized 
words. In both studies, participants categorized animates faster in the categorization phase, they 
recognized more animates, and they had a better memory for the contextual information of the 
animate words. False alarm rates were not different between the two groups and an index of bias 
analysis showed no difference in bias between animate and inanimate, suggesting attention was 
not preferentially drawn towards animates. Overall, the results illustrated that memory for 
contextual information was enhanced when it was related to animacy, even when animates were 
processed more quickly and learning was incidental. 
 These early experiments testing the robustness and replicability of the animacy 
effect showed that animacy enhances memory in free recall and cued recall, including paired-
association tasks, it appears to aid memory for spatial and temporal contexts, and has been found 
in both word and picture tasks, and with both adults and children (Aslan & John, 2016; Bonin et 
al., 2014; Gelin et al., 2017; Nairne et al., 2013; VanArsdall et al., 2013, 2015). These studies 
have also established that animates are processed more quickly, determined by categorization or 
reaction time, suggesting that the animacy advantage is not a byproduct of processing time. 
Other studies have looked directly into possible variables that underlie the animacy effect. For 
example, VanArsdall et al. (2017) elaborated on VanArsdall et al. (2015) by testing the idea that 
the animacy effect may be due to more efficient category retrieval cues stemming from animates 
potentially being a more cohesive category with more diagnostic features than inanimates. 
VanArsdall et al. (2017) used an embedded list task to mask any category formation by 
participants and still found that animates were remembered better than inanimates. Similarly, 
Gelin et al. (2015) used various instructions at encoding to rule out the idea that the animacy 
advantage is dependent on encoding instructions that prompt the effect. Bonin et al. (2015) 
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investigated the role of different forms of deep processing, including elaboration and richness-of-
encoding, by adding a concurrent memory load task during initial processing of the words, which 
is thought to block the use of elaboration strategies (Nouchi, 2013). In a different experiment, 
Bonin et al. instructed participants to imagine themselves interacting with each word to examine 
the role of interactive imagery processing. More animate words were remembered than 
inanimate words in both studies. However, the interactive memory task did boost memory for 
inanimates but not animates, decreasing the overall difference between animates and inanimates. 
Bonin et al. concluded that processing of animates may trigger the use of interactive imagery. 
However, because a significant difference between the number of animates and inanimates 
remembered remained in the interactive imagery condition, Bonin et al. suggested that 
interactive imagery is not the only proximate mechanism that gives animate stimuli a memory 
boost compared with inanimates. 
The current study required new methods for testing the animacy effect that would reflect 
previous word-based tasks in the animacy literature while exploring animacy’s role in memory 
and attention. A series of pilot studies was conducted for this purpose. First, a symbolic match-
to-sample (SMTS) task was piloted to mirror the paired-association word-learning tasks that have 
been commonly employed by previous animacy research (Aslan & John, 2016; Bonin et al., 
2014; Gelin et al., 2017; VanArsdall et al., 2013, 2015), as well as a serial-probe recognition task 
that embodies the recognition-memory tests with word stimuli. I also explored the effects of 
potential types of stimuli, specifically whether the line-drawing stimuli used by Bonin, Gelin, 
and Bugaiska (2014) would be adequate for reproducing the animacy effects found by Bonin et 
al. (2014) without including a written label with the picture stimuli. I also examined whether 
food stimuli would be a meaningful variable to include within the inanimate category. 
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Specifically, including food in the inanimate category could potentially weaken the animacy 
effect, given that it is also related to survival, but is categorized as inanimate. 
1.2 Expected Results  
The effect of animacy on memory and attention is a relatively new finding that appears in 
a limited number of studies. At this time, it is not known whether animacy status itself is the 
salient feature driving the animacy effect or if there are other as-yet untested cues that underlie 
the salience and recruit other memory and attention strategies. Most of the research has been 
focused specifically on why and when the animacy effect appears, rather than on how. 
Additionally, no studies to date have examined whether animacy effects would be apparent in 
responses by nonhuman animals. Testing the animacy effect in nonhuman animals may help to 
answer questions about ultimate mechanisms and give some insight into proximate mechanisms: 
whether animacy itself is the driving force of the memory and attention effect. Nonhuman 
animals encounter both living and nonliving stimuli, but are not subject to most of the 
experiential, language-based, or interpretation confounds that might affect human participants. 
Demonstration of animacy effects in attention and memory performance by nonhuman animals 
will thus serve both to extend the effect to new populations and also to narrow the list of possible 
mechanisms.  
The task was designed to incorporate new picture-based methods that are suitable for 
both humans and nonhuman primates (hereafter primates) in testing the animacy effect. In the 
study, I examined whether the animacy effect is seen in primates and whether using pictures as 
stimuli changes the effect in humans. I predicted that if imagery plays a role in enhancing 
memory for animates, then using pictures would weaken the difference between animates and 
inanimates relative to effects reported in the literature for word stimuli (Aslan & John, 2016; 
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Bonin et al., 2014; Gelin et al., 2017; VanArsdall et al., 2013, 2015), similar to the findings of 
using interactive imagery in Bonin et al. (2015). Examining contexts in which the animacy effect 
appears or disappears will help identify whether animacy status has a direct effect on memory 
and attention or whether other mechanisms mediate animacy’s role. 
Animacy’s effect on memory has primarily been tested using recall and recognition of 
written words. Only one experiment so far has tested animacy memory using pictures (Bonin et 
al., 2014); however, Bonin and colleagues also included the written name of the picture stimuli 
with each stimulus presentation. Thus, the field lacks evidence to show that the memory 
advantage is not solely a language-based effect and that it will hold true for rich visual stimuli 
without written labels.  
The current study required new methods for testing the animacy effect that would reflect 
previous word-based tasks in the animacy literature while exploring animacy’s role in memory 
and attention. A series of pilot studies was conducted for this purpose. First, a symbolic match-
to-sample (SMTS) task was piloted to mirror the paired-association word-learning tasks that have 
been commonly employed by previous animacy research (Aslan & John, 2016; Bonin et al., 
2014; Gelin et al., 2017; VanArsdall et al., 2013, 2015), as well as a serial-probe recognition task 
that embodies the recognition-memory tests with word stimuli. I also explored the effects of 
potential types of stimuli, specifically whether the line-drawing stimuli used by Bonin, Gelin, 
and Bugaiska (2014) would be adequate for reproducing the animacy effects found by Bonin et 
al. (2014) without including a written label with the picture stimuli. I also examined whether 
food stimuli would be a meaningful variable to include within the inanimate category. 
Specifically, including food in the inanimate category could potentially weaken the animacy 
effect, given that it is also related to survival, but is categorized as inanimate.  
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1.2.1 Method 
In the SMTS tasks, participants were shown an arbitrary symbol (lexigram) and were told 
to match the lexigram to its corresponding picture. (For specific pilot-study details, refer to 
Appendix A and B; however, the general method and results will be reported here.) Lexigram-
picture pairs were randomly chosen before the experiment, and participants needed to learn the 
pairs by trial and error. During the learning phase, lexigrams were presented with two possible 
choices. A block of trials consisted of one trial for each lexigram-picture pair, and trials within 
each block were randomly ordered. After a certain number of learning blocks, dependent on the 
task, participants completed a filler task for 20 minutes, followed by a test phase. The test phase 
included one trial per lexigram-picture pair, and unlike the learning phase, there were four 
possible picture choices. 
In the serial-probe recognition task (see Appendix A for detailed methods), participants 
saw a series of stimuli presented one at a time. At the end of the series, participants were 
presented with two stimuli and were asked to choose the stimulus that was in the preceding 
series. Series ranged from 6 to 12 items and included an equal number of animate and inanimate 
stimuli. 
1.2.2 Results 
No significant differences between animate and inanimate stimuli were found in the SPR task. 
However, significant differences between stimulus types were found in all three SMTS task. The 
effect of adding food stimuli to the inanimate group produced conflicting results from what was 
expected, as it was hypothesized that the animacy effect would be weakened by adding a 
survival-relevant category to the inanimate category. In contrast, adding food increased the 
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difference between animate and inanimate groups in both experiments that included food as a 
stimulus category (see Table 1; Experiments A & B). 
Table 1. Pilot Results. 








Animate Mean 0.82 0.74 0.68 0.81 
Animate SD 0.21 0.24 0.25 0.08 
Inanimate M (without 
food) 0.78 0.69 0.58 0.79 
Inanimate SD (without 
food) 0.2 0.27 0.26 0.12 
Inanimate M (with food) 0.76 0.62 NA NA 
Inanimate SD (with 
food) 0.23 0.24 NA NA 













.01 NA NA 
1.2.3 Discussion 
The SMTS task provided some significant differences between animate and inanimate 
stimuli and seemed like the task that the monkeys would most likely and most quickly learn. 
Although food was initially included in the stimulus pool, foods were removed as potential 
stimuli after Experiment B because the addition of food to the analysis yielded confusing results. 
Although it seems important to investigate why humans treated food stimuli as extremely 
inanimate, that question was beyond the scope of the present thesis. Thus, food stimuli were 
excluded from subsequent experiments. 
Additionally, although simple black-and-white line drawings are easier to standardize and 
control, it was concluded that real photographic images with no background would be more 
appropriate to use with nonhuman primates. Thus, it was decided to use the SMTS methodology 
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with photographs of animate and inanimate stimuli, excluding all food pictures from the stimulus 
pool. 
1.3 Current Study 
The current study consisted of two tasks: SMTS and antisaccade. SMTS was used to 
examine the role of animacy on memory, similar to the use of paired-association and list 
recognition paradigms in the majority of studies to date in which the effect of animacy on 
memory has been examined (Aslan & John, 2016; Bonin et al., 2014; Gelin et al., 2017; 
VanArsdall et al., 2013, 2015).  The antisaccade task was used to explore animacy’s effect on 
attention. Efficient antisaccade performance requires participants to control the reflexive 
tendency to orient toward a stimulus (whether animate or inanimate) that captures attention by 
flashing in the participant’s peripheral vision. Thus far, no experiments have used antisaccade 
tasks to look exclusively at the role of animacy on attention. Antisaccade tasks SMTS and 
antisaccade have been successfully applied to work with primates (e.g.  Johnston & Everling, 
2006; Washburn, Hopkins, & Rumbaugh, 1989), but never with animacy as an independent 
variable. In accordance with animacy literature, it was predicted that more animate stimuli 
should be remembered than inanimate stimuli in the SMTS task, and that animate stimuli would 
capture and hold attention longer than animate stimuli in the antisaccade task, making it harder 
for the participant to orient away from the animate cue compared with the inanimate cue.  
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2  EXPERIMENT 
2.1 Participants 
Humans. A total of 128 undergraduates from Georgia State University participated in a 
one-hour study as partial fulfillment of a course requirement. From this sample, 47 were tested 
with the SMTS task and 81 were tested the antisaccade task, described below. 
Monkeys. Five adult male rhesus macaques housed at Georgia State University’s 
Language Research Center (LRC) participated in the study. All had been trained previously to 
use an automated test station located in their home cages (Richardson et al., 1990; Rumbaugh et 
al., 1989). The macaques had 24-hour access to the test station, working when they chose. The 
current experiment was part of a larger schedule of tasks, and therefore the monkeys only had 
access to the tasks in this experiment on a set number of days, dependent on individual 
schedules. Subjects were not food or water deprived for this testing. 
2.2 Apparatus 
Humans. Testing took place in the Individual Differences in Executive Attention 
laboratory at Georgia State University. Participants were individually seated at computer testing 
stations consisting of a computer, joystick, and headphones. For correct responses, participants 
heard a “whoop” sound, but for incorrect responses, participants heard a “buzz” sound and 
received an 8-s timeout.   
Monkeys. A total of 128 undergraduates from Georgia State University participated in a 
one-hour study as partial fulfillment of a course requirement. From this sample, 47 were tested 
with the SMTS task and 81 were tested the antisaccade task, described below. 
The macaques were tested using the LRC Computerized Testing Apparatus (described in 
Richardson et al., 1990). The test station consisted of a computer, joystick, pellet dispenser, and 
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speaker. For correct responses, the monkey heard a “whoop” sound and received an automated 
delivery of a 45-mg banana-flavored pellet via a pellet dispenser. For incorrect responses, the 
monkey heard a “buzz” and received a 12-s timeout.  
All tasks were written in Python 2.7 with pygame 1.9.1 library installed. Picture stimuli 
were selected from the Bank of Standardized Stimuli (BOSS), a database of color photos with no 
background that have been normalized across more than 15 dimensions (Brodeur, Guérard, & 
Bouras, 2014). The set did not include multiple photos of the same kind of object or species (e.g., 
two different violins). Each monkey had an individualized subset of BOSS stimuli formed with 
data from the pilot classification task (see Appendix B). 
2.3 General Procedures 
Humans. Before beginning the task, participants received simple written instructions 
about the task, including information about feedback and trial initiation procedures. Participants 
were also informed that more correct responses would shorten the length of the task.  
Monkeys. The experiment took place during multiple half-day sessions, intermixed with a 
variety of other cognitive tasks throughout the course of this study. Additionally, all monkeys 
completed pilot testing that confirmed they were capable of generalizing category membership of 
inanimate versus animate picture stimuli to novel picture stimuli (See Appendix B). 
2.3.1 Experiment 1: SMTS Procedure  
In SMTS tasks, the relation between the sample (lexigram) and the target stimulus was 
randomly determined by the experimenter. Participants learned the arbitrary relationships and 
then could be tested on their ability to remember the learned relationships. In this task, memory 
strength was measured by correct and incorrect matches during a test phase that took place after 
initial training and an unrelated filler task. 
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For this task, a picture appeared on the screen and once participants touched the picture, 
using a joystick, the picture disappeared and two arbitrary symbols (hereafter lexigrams) 
appeared on the screen randomly in two of the four corners. One lexigram was the target that 
correctly paired with the picture and the other was a foil. The participant used the joystick to 
choose the lexigram that was paired with the picture. Lexigram-picture pairs had to be learned 
via trial and error throughout a training phase. Each training block consisted of each lexigram-
picture pair presented one time in a random order. The test phase was identical to training, except 
there were 4 lexigram options instead of 2, appearing in all four corners of the screen. 
Participants completed a training phase, followed by an unrelated filler task, followed by a test 
phase (see Figure 1). The test session consisted of one trial per lexigram-picture pair. For the 
present study, 30 pictures were randomly chosen from the stimulus set (15 animate and 15 
inanimate) and randomly paired with one of 60 possible lexigrams. The additional unmatched 30 
lexigrams were intermixed as foils to correct choices. 
 
Figure 1. SMTS Experimental Setup. Each box represents a different screen for the SMTS 
task. First participants completed a number of training blocks, followed by a filler task, 
and lastly, they completed the test block.  
Humans. Each participant completed one session consisting of four training blocks (n = 
120). After training, participants spent 15 minutes working on an unrelated filler task that 
consisted of an absolute-quantity discrimination task that required participants to make speeded 
judgments on quantity size of an array of dots. After the filler task, participants completed the 
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test phase trials (n = 30). Participants who were not above 60% accuracy in the training phase 
were excluded from analysis (n = 9). 
Monkeys. Each subject was given five sessions consisting of 25 training blocks, each 
block with 30 trials (n = 750 trials per session). Two monkeys needed an additional training 
session to reach an accuracy of above 60%. Subjects then received a test session consisting of 5 
training blocks, followed by 20 minutes on the CHASE or Pursuit task (described in Rumbaugh 
et al., 1989) as a filler, followed by the test phase.  
2.3.2 Experiment 2: Antisaccade Procedure 
In an antisaccade task, participants learn that the antisaccade cue serves as a reliable 
indicator that a target will appear on the opposite side of the screen to the peripheral stimuli. 
Participants can utilize the cue and shift their focus in the opposite direction to the target 
resulting in better performance in cued trials versus non-cued trials. Thus, the antisaccade task is 
used as a measure of inhibitory control. For the present study, participants made a speeded two-
choice discrimination based on the identity of a target that was located either to the left or right 
of the screen, and the targets were either an “E” or an “F.” 
Participants began a trial by moving their cursor to a box in the center of the screen. In 
order for the trial to begin, the cursor needed to remain in the box for 2 s. This ensured that 
participants were not holding the cursor in any one direction when the response screen appeared. 
Additionally, when the start screen appeared, the cursor would be randomly located in one of the 
four corners of the screen, also to ensure that the participant could not hold the joystick in one 
direction throughout the task. For the monkey task, the start box changed colors to help a 
monkey know when they were appropriately inside the square.  
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During training, participants received two types of trials: Introductory E or F trials, where 
the E or F would appear on the screen for 600 ms; and introductory antisaccade trials, where the 
E of F would appear on the screen for 400 ms after either a 400-ms pause, or 400 ms display of 
an antisaccade cue. The antisaccade introductory cue was a red “X” stimulus that appeared in 
50% of the trials prior to, and on the opposite side of the screen from, the subsequent E or F 
target (see Figure 2). The training trials were used to teach participants to deflect the E and the F 
targets correctly and prepared participants to make use of antisaccade cues. 
After training, participants received a test phase which consisted of an animate or 
inanimate stimulus as the antisaccade cue on 25% of the trials. In these trials, the E or F target 
would appear on the screen for 200 ms after either a 200-ms pause, or the display of an 
antisaccade cue. Speed and accuracy of joystick deflection were recorded for all trials.  
 
Figure 2. Antisaccade Experimental Setup for the training trials. Each box represents a 
different screen for the antisaccade task. 
Humans. 81 participants completed one session consisting of the both the training and 
test phase. Participants were given 10 introductory E vs. F trials, followed by 15 introductory 
antisaccade trials, and then 150 test trials.  Participants were excluded from analysis for not 
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finishing the task (n = 6) or for failing to reach learning criteria, set at 80% correct during 
introductory antisaccade trials during training, (n = 4). 
 Monkeys. Each subject was trained to deflect his cursor appropriately for E and F 
targets. Four out of five monkeys required forced trials on a proportion of training trials in order 
to remove bias for deflecting the joystick one way over the other. All monkeys required several 
sessions where the E and F did not disappear from the screen during their response. After a 
monkey reached 80% correct in non-forced training trials where the E and F remained on the 
screen, they received training sessions consisting of 100 introductory E vs F trials, and 600 
introductory cue trials (Figure 3). When subjects reached 80% correct on these training sessions, 
they received a test session consisting of 100 introductory E vs F trials, 200 introductory 
antisaccade cue trials, and 900 test trials, in this order. One monkey was removed from the task 
when he did not exceed chance levels after 10 sessions (~8,000 trials) after the forced-trial 
training. Multiple efforts were made to improve performance by varying timeout length and 
number of pellets dispensed. Two additional monkeys were removed from the task after fourteen 
sessions for unrelated health concerns. Two monkeys reached the 80% correct training criteria 
and were able to complete the antisaccade test phase. 
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Figure 3. Training curve for the 3 monkeys that were not removed for health concerns. 
Learning start box sessions were the sessions where the macaques were struggling to 
understand how to use the start box to begin a trial, and trial count was low in these 
sessions. TO is timeout length in seconds. 
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3  RESULTS 
3.1 SMTS 
A one-tailed t-test was used to analyze the difference between the number of correct trials 
with animates and number of correct trals with inanimates in the test phase because it was 
expected that animates would be better remembered than inanimates. Humans did not show a 
significant difference between the two stimulus types: Animates, M = 12.32 (82%), SD = 2.28; 
Inanimates, M = 12.00 (80%), SD = 2.70; t(37) = 0.77 p = .22. Of the 38 participants, 14 
remembered more animates than inanimates (in absolute terms), 13 remembered more 
inanimates than animates, and 11 remembered an equal number of each type. Monkeys, 
however, did remember significantly more animates than inanimates: Animates, M = 5.6, SD = 
2.88; Inanimates, M = 4.0, SD = 2.74; t(4) = 2.36, p = .04 (Figure 4). Additionally, all human 
participants performed significantly above chance levels during the test phase (i.e., accuracy >= 
.4 for chance levels of .25, p < .05), but only two out of five monkeys were significantly above 
chance.  
 

























In order to remove trials in which a participant was not paying attention, all trials with a 
reaction time greater than 2,000 ms were excluded from analysis. Outliers, defined as reaction 
times greater than 3 standard deviations from the mean, were also excluded.  Response times 
were also excluded for trials in which an error was made. Because I expected animate cues to 
produce a significantly longer RT than inanimate cues, a one-tailed paired t-test was used to 
analyze the difference between the reaction time of correct animate versus correct inanimate 
antisaccade trials. On average, humans did not show a difference in reaction time when cued by 
animate cues compared to inanimate cues, t(70) = 0.98 p = .17 (Figure 5). Both monkeys that 
completed the antisaccade task exhibited a slight but nonsignificant increase in reaction time 
when cued by inanimate cues compared to animate cues, t(1) = -1.48 p = .81. Additionally, there 
was no significant difference in accuracy between animate and inanimate antisaccade trials for 
both humans and monkeys, p > .05 (Figure 6). Although there was no difference between 
reaction time of animate versus inanimate cued trials, cued trials resulted in significantly longer 
reaction times compared with baseline (non-cued) trials for humans, t(70) = 3.87 p < .001, but 
not for monkeys, p > .05 (Figure 5). 
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Figure 5. Mean reaction time for correct responses on trials that were uncued (baseline) or 
cued with animate or inanimate stimuli in the antisaccade task, with standard deviation 
bars, by species.  
 
Figure 6. Mean proportion correct on trials that were uncued (baseline) or cue with 





















































In this study, humans and monkeys were given both a SMTS and antisaccade task to 
investigate the hypothesis that the animacy status of stimuli would affect memory and attention. 
Specifically, in this experiment I tested whether animate stimuli were better remembered and 
more closely monitored than inanimate stimuli. According to the animacy effect hypothesis 
(VanArsdall et al., 2013) and the animate-monitoring hypothesis (New et al., 2007), humans 
have evolved to prioritize processing of animate entities over inanimate entities because animates 
would have been the more important to remember and monitor, as they could be predators, prey, 
mates, or sources of social information.  However, the animacy effect and animate monitoring 
hypothesis are relatively new findings that are still in the early stages of being understood. 
Whereas researchers have claimed the effect to be robust (Bonin et al., 2015), there have been 
few publications and variations on methodologies, especially with respect to the effects of 
animacy on attention. The current experiment was the first, to my knowledge, to use pictures in 
any animacy-effect investigation and the first to use an antisaccade task with any stimulus types 
to test for the animacy effect.  
The results of this study provide no support for an effect of animacy on attention and only 
superficial support animacy’s effect on memory. Importantly, cued tasks took significantly 
longer to respond to, for human participants, compared with uncued trials, and monkeys showed 
no difference in RT to cued and uncued trials. This fails to replicate the basic antisaccade 
phenomena where we expect the cued trials to facilitate performance compared with uncued, to 
the degree the participant can utilize the cue and shift attention in the opposite direction. For 
humans, the data suggest both stimulus types captured attention and equally impeded 
performance, but for monkeys, there is no evidence that the flashing cues captured attention, 
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relative to baseline. Additionally, neither species exhibited a significant difference in reaction 
time when animate stimuli were presented versus when inanimate stimuli were presented as cues 
in this task. That is, animate cues did not capture and hold attention longer than inanimate cues 
in the antisaccade task.  These results contrast with previous animate monitoring research in 
humans (Altman et al., 2016; New et al., 2007) and suggest that animacy status may not play as 
central a role in attention as previously thought. Findings by Altman and colleagues (2016) had 
suggested that animate entities in a change detection task will distract from inanimate targets 
even when the animate entity is unchanging and not the target of the trial. Therefore, it was 
predicted for the antisaccade test in the current experiment that animate stimuli would be more 
likely to capture and hold attention, as evidenced by less efficient shifting of attention away from 
the flash of the animate cue and towards the target stimulus (E or F). Additionally, it was 
anticipated that targets that flashed following animate cues would be more likely to be missed 
resulting in more incorrect responses during animate cued trials. However, the current 
experiment yielded no evidence to support these predictions. There was no difference in 
attentional control as a function of cue-stimulus animacy.  
Why might this be? Unlike in the Altman et al. experiment (2016), animate and inanimate 
distractors were not directly pitted against each other in the current study, so that they competed 
directly for attention in individual trials. This allows for the possibility that rich visual stimuli, 
whether animate or inanimate, were equally distracting. Effects on attention might only be 
observed when the animate and inanimate cues are directly and simultaneously competing on a 
trial-by-trial bases, allowing one (e.g., animate) to pull attention from the other (e.g., inanimate). 
Follow-up studies could explore this suggestion using a dot-probe task (e.g., Mogg & Bradley, 
1998) in which participants identify the location of a dot, presented on the left or right side of the 
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screen following the bilateral presentation of competing stimulus primes (e.g., an animate and an 
inanimate image, randomize to left or right positions). Allocation of attention is measured by the 
time to react to the presentation of the dot probe. Researchers suggest that RT is faster when 
attention is already allocated to the side where the dot probe appears (Koster et al., 2004). The 
dot-probe task has been used to study attention bias to emotion cues, for example, but never to 
stimuli that varied in animacy. We could hypothesize that if animates are attracting more 
attention than inanimate, that RT would be faster for trials when the dot probe appears on the 
same side as the animate stimulus, as attention would already be allocated to that side over the 
inanimate stimulus.  
Additionally, the Altman et al. (2016) task presented vivid scenes where the animal, while 
camouflaged and thus sharing bottom-up features with the background, was still the only animate 
entity in the scene. However, the inanimate target was fully integrated into the inanimate scene, 
making the animate-inanimate distinction simultaneously a figure-ground distinction (Altman et 
al., 2016). This may have allowed animates to “pop out” as the singleton or odd-item (i.e., only 
animate) in the scene, capturing attention and being easily perceived as the figure-focal point of 
the scene. Altman and colleagues recognized this potential confound.   In contrast, the current 
study involved animate and inanimate distractors with no background, removing the possibility 
of the figure-ground confound.  All stimuli would pop-out by virtue of flashing. That is, it seems 
possible that the Altman findings were less about animate stimuli capturing attention more than 
inanimate stimuli, but rather resulted from the inanimate stimuli contrasting less from the 
background images.  Perhaps an inanimate object embedded in animate stimuli would have 
similarly popped-out and captured attention.  Follow-up investigations to the present study 
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should explore this possibility by using visual search in which target and foil animacy status are 
manipulated factorially.  
It is interesting that superficial support for the animacy effect in memory was found in the 
SMTS monkey task. Monkeys did remember significantly more animate than inanimate stimulus 
pairs. However, caution is required when interpreting this difference. Despite previous training, 
two out of five of the monkeys were at chance-levels during the test phase, likely due to the 
increase from two-choice trials in training to four-choice trials in the test phase. Additionally, 
two out of five of the monkeys remembered exactly the same number of animates and 
inanimates. Whereas there is no denying that the overall means were significantly different, and 
thus provide some support for the animacy effect, it would be negligent to ignore the role of 
individual differences and chance-level results. Future research is needed that includes more 
monkeys and increases training criteria, to ensure all monkeys are above chance-levels at before 
the testing phase. This will help to reveal whether monkeys in general are more like the three 
animals that showed an advantage for memory of animates, or like the two monkeys who 
remained at chance performance.   
Perhaps most damning to the suggestion that meaningful animacy effects were obtained for 
the monkeys is the fact that no significant difference was found for humans between the number 
of animate versus inanimate stimuli remembered in the SMTS task. It seems difficult to interpret 
animacy effects for monkeys in the absence of similar effects on the same task for humans. 
Again, these results contradict previous findings from research with human participants—
including the encouraging trends in my own pilot tests. The literature suggests that humans are 
adapted to remember animate over inanimate stimuli. It must be noted, however, that all previous 
memory studies, to my knowledge, have had a language-based component. That is, either 
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participants were learning lists of words, relations between words (e.g Popp & Serra, 2015; 
VanArsdall et al., 2016) or, in one instance, participants were remembering pictures with word 
labels (Bonin et al., 2014).  Animate words are better remembered than inanimate words, even 
when the words are matched on other variables like familiarity, frequency, and concreteness that 
are known to affect memorability (Bonin et al., 2014). Thus, previous research has left 
unanswered the question of whether animacy’s memory advantage is solely a language-based 
effect. The lack of significant differences in the current experiment’s SMTS data from humans 
provides the first evidence on this question, supporting this possibility.   
There is, however, published research to suggest why picture stimuli might not be effective 
for demonstrating the animacy effect. Bonin and collaborators (2015) suggested that imagery 
may play a role in why animate words are better remembered than inanimates. They found that 
requiring participants to encode animate or inanimate words using interactive imagery did not 
increase the recall rate of animate words, but did increase the recall rate of inanimate words. 
Animate words were remembered significantly better, but Bonin and collaborators suggested that 
processing animate words may naturally prompt the use of interactive imagery more so than 
inanimate words. If the animacy effect depends on imagery mechanisms, then it might follow 
that one would get no animacy effect with picture stimuli, which do not require participants to 
generate mental images (the image is visible). Thus, it is possible that using pictures, as in the 
current experiment, equated and controlled for the differences in imagery previously found 
between animate and inanimate words. However, it must be acknowledged that many animacy 
researchers have attempted to control for imageability and similar variables in their word list and 
still found a significant difference between animate and inanimate memory (e.g. Nairne et al., 
2017; Popp & Serra, 2015), so it remains undetermined the amount of influence imagery has on 
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the animacy effect. Subsequent research could be used to test this by presenting picture stimuli 
but specifically encouraging participants to imagine the images interacting with one another. 
The use of picture stimuli was seen as a strength in the present study as they allowed 
nonhuman subjects to be tested using the same method as humans, and they allowed potential 
language-effects to be examined.  However, the use of picture stimuli also introduced limitations. 
Previous animacy studies have utilized word stimuli because they are more easily controlled. 
Whereas the pictures used in the current study had been normalized along a variety of factors 
(Brodeur et al., 2014), it was impossible simultaneously to control for every potential influencing 
factor. Additionally, the BOSS stimulus set has been standardized for humans and not for 
monkeys, which may have influenced monkey results in unknown ways. The preliminary pilot 
testing with the monkeys addressed some of these potential ways, for instance by showing that 
monkeys could distinguish between the images, and could categorize them as animate or 
inanimate. The stimuli used with each monkey were the ones that he had individually 
categorized reliably as animate or inanimate, but may well have differed between other images 
on other variables that affected memorability.  
I plan to continue this line of research by first rerunning the SMTS task with humans using 
words instead of picture targets and again with pictures with added written labels. These two 
tasks should replicate findings by Bonin et al., (2016), and any differences in results might 
indicate an issue in my SMTS method. I will then reevaluate how best to find the animacy effect 
in humans before reintroducing pictures, without labels, and before introducing the task back to 
the monkeys. I could then parse out why some researchers found the effect and others did not, 
looking not only at the type of stimuli (picture versus word), but also to explore systematically 
the individual stimuli and possible confounding variables (e.g., imagability) that may influence 
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performance. I also plan to continue to train the monkeys that were dropped from the antisaccade 
task and hope to reanalyze the data if and after they master the task.  
Acknowledging the limitations of the present study and the additional research that is 
needed, taken together with my pilot research, I tentatively suggest that the animacy effects 
found by other researchers are limited to linguistic stimuli for humans. In contrast, I have found, 
with qualifications on interpretability, preliminary evidence for the animacy effect in primates. 
Across species, there is no evidence of an attention bias toward animate versus inanimate stimuli. 
However, given that the antisaccade task did not produce the pattern of results typical in the 
antisaccade literature, researchers may want to use other attention-capture paradigms to 
investigate this in the future.  
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The pilot studies were exploratory; thus, multiple variables were manipulated in an 
attempt to find tasks and parameters that were best for this investigation. The tasks are described 
in general terms in the body of the thesis, and the results are reported there. The details below 
augment that discussion with the specific conditions administered. 
Appendix A 
Participants. A total of 75 undergraduates from Georgia State University participated in a 
one-hour study as partial fulfillment of a course requirement. From this sample, 61 completed a 
SMTS pilot task (see Table 2) and 14 completed the SPR task. 
General Procedure. Testing took place in the Individual Differences in Executive 
Attention laboratory at Georgia State University. Participants were individually seated at 
computer testing stations consisting of a computer, joystick, and headphones. For correct 
responses, participants heard a “whoop” sound, but for incorrect responses, participants heard a 
“buzz” sound and received an 8-s timeout.  Before beginning the task, participants received 
simple written and instructions about the task, including information about feedback and trial 
initiation procedures. All tasks were written in Python 2.7 with Pygame 1.9.1 library installed. 
Appendix A.1 SMTS 
The General Procedure for this pilot study was identical to that described in detail in  
Experiment 1 (see Figure 1). The studies were varied on the number of stimuli presented, 
number of training blocks, and whether food was included as a stimulus type. Additionally, the 
first two pilot studies used stimuli from the Snodgrass and Vanderwart’s set of standardized line 
drawings (1980), in an attempt to reproduce the animacy effect found in free recall with pictures 
from Bonin, Gelin, and Bugaiska (2013). All proceeding experiments in this study used a 
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selection of picture stimuli taken from the Bank of Standardized Stimuli (BOSS; Brodeur et al., 
2014).  
Table 2. Procedural differences in the three SMTS pilot studies.  
 Pilot A Pilot B Pilot C 
Number of human participants 41 13 7 
Number of animate stimuli used 5 10 13 
Number of inanimate stimuli used 5 10 13 
Number of food stimuli 2 10 0 
Number of training blocks of XX trials 5 5 3 
Number of training trials (total stimuli X blocks) 35 150 39 
 
Appendix A.2 SPR Procedures 
To begin a trial, participants used a joystick to move the cursor to an “X” on the screen. 
Next, a series of picture stimuli flashed consecutively on the screen for 250ms each. Each series 
consisted of 6, 8, 10, or 12 stimuli with an equal number of animate and inanimate stimuli. 
Number of stimuli in a series and order of stimulus presentation varied randomly. After the series 
completed, a choice screen appeared that presented participants with two stimuli: one that had 
been seen in the preceding series and a foil. Participants were asked to choose the stimulus that 
they had seen before. The experiment consisted of 60 total trials. This study used a selection of 




Subjects. Five adult male rhesus macaques housed at the LRC participated in the study 
using the LRC Computerized Testing Apparatus (Rumbaugh et al., 1989; Richardson et al., 1990). 
The test station consisted of a computer, joystick, pellet dispenser, and speaker. The macaques 
had 24-hour access to the test station, working when they chose. The experiment took place 
during multiple half-day sessions, intermixed with a variety of other cognitive tasks during the 
course of this study. Subjects were not food or water deprived for this testing.  
Procedure. Monkeys were trained to categorize animate and inanimate stimuli. Each trail 
consisted of one stimulus being presented in the top-middle of the screen, with a red X in the 
lower left corner and a blue O in the lower right corner. Monkeys were trained to move the 
cursor to the X when an animate stimulus was present, and to the O for an inanimate stimulus 
(see Figure 7). For correct responses, the monkey heard a “whoop” sound and received an 
automated delivery of a 45-mg banana-flavored pellet via a pellet dispenser. For incorrect 
responses, the monkey heard a “buzz” and received an 8-s timeout.  
 
Figure 7. Screen view of classification pilot task. Participants learn to categorize animate 
stimuli as “X” and inanimate stimuli as “O”. Participants move the cursor to the correct letter to 
make their selection.  
During training, 150 training stimuli were used, 75 of each category. Training stimuli 
consisted of non-standardized stimuli from the BOSS database (Brodeur et al., 2014), as well as 
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other backgroundless photos found on the internet. Each session consisted of 3000 trials, in 
random order.  
 After each monkey was categorizing training pictures correctly for > 90% of trials 
over a series of at least three sessions, a set of twelve to twenty novel pictures (equal number of 
animate and inanimate) was introduced in to the mix of potential stimuli for a period of one 
session. Probe stimuli were presented randomly in 1/6th of the trials. Novel probe stimuli 
consisted of standardized pictures taken from the BOSS database, a database of color photos 
with no background that have been normalized across more than 15 dimensions (Brodeur et al., 
2014). In total, there were 13 sets of 12-20 novel probe pictures (226 pictures total), resulting in 
13 sessions of post-training probe data. The monkeys’ categorization of these novel pictures 
resulted in variable and random feedback to ensure the monkeys could not learn correct 
responses from the program.  
Results. The percent correct for novel pictures was analyzed and sets of pictures that 
resulted in above 80% correct were formed for each individual monkey (Table 3). If a monkey 
completed fewer than 1,000 trials on a given probe session, that session was repeated. Pictures 
from individualized sets were then used as the stimuli in Experiments 1 & 2.  The same pictures 
were not used in both experiments for each monkey. 
Table 3. Proportion of novel stimuli that each monkey received greater than 80% correct on, 
and thus were included in the individualized stimulus sets.  
 
 
Proportion >80%
Chewie 0.704
Han 0.77
Lou 0.588
Luke 0.664
Obi 0.752
